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In this paper, we re—examine the standard analysis of the short—run
effect of a personal tax cut. If consumer spending generates more money
demand than other components of GNP, then tax cuts may,byincreasing the
demand for money, depress aggregate demand. We examine a variety of evidence
and conclude that the necessary condition for contractionary tax cuts is
probably satisfied for the U.S. economy.
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This paper re—examines the standard Keynesian analysis of the short—rin
effectof a personal tax cut.Thetextbook conclusion is that a taxcut
expands aggregate demand and output so long as the money supply is held
constant.Conversely, a tax increase is contractionary according to the
conventional analysis. This result, however, is sensitive to the form of
the money demand function.1 In particular, ifconsumerexpenditure genera-
tesmore money demand than other components of GNP, as is plausible a
priori, then the effect of a tax cut on aggregate demand is in general ambi-
guous. If money demand is sufficiently interest inelastic, then tax cuts
are contractionary.
Theory thus doesnot provide a clear answer to the question of whether
taxcuts are expansionary. Despite itsimportance for macro—economic
policy, however, there is surprisingly little empirical work addressing this
issue. As we discuss more fully below, the existing studies ofmoney demand
do not support the textbook formulation. Moreover, tax cuts have histori-
cally been coupled with accomodating monetary policy. Case studies of these
policy interventions can shed only little light on the question of what the
effects would have been bad the monetary authority held the money supply
constant.Although simulationsof macro—econometric models support the
textbookconclusion, these simulations assume particular specifications of
the money demand functionandare thus not probative regarding the issue we
address. Existing empirical work, therefore, provides little evidenceupon
which to evaluate the standard conclusion that tax cuts are expansionary.
LSee Holmes and Sth [1972), Darby [1976, p.3151and Phelps [1982].
We are told that this sensitivity has formed the basis of exam questions at
Princeton and Yale Universities.—2—
In this paper, we exam.ine the evidence andconcludethatconsumer
expenditure does generate more money demand thanothercomponents of GNP.
Atthe very- least, this conclusion implies that tax cuts are much less
expansionarythan iswidely believed. Whether they are expansionary- at all
depends upon parameters of the IS curve as well as those of the LM curve.
Using estimates from other studies, we show that the condition for tax cuts
to be contractionary appears to be satisfied for the U.S. econoiiy.
Our results have implications for recent policy- discussions. Since a
more monetarist policy environment prevailed in the period between 1979 and
1983, the large tax cuts during this period may have been partly responsible
for the deep recession and the concurrent reduction in inflation. Moreover,
tax increases to reduce the large current and prospective deficits are not
likely to depress the econoir unless the Fed responds to them by reducing
the rate of money growth.
This analysis o± fiscal policy follows the standard practice of'
assuming the money supply is held fixed. In practice, however, the monetary
authority is unlikely to ignore the actions of the fical authority. Even
if the monetary authority is non—reactive,the effects of fiscal policy rest
criticallyon the rule the monetary authority is following. For example,
evenif taxcuts are contractionary under a constant money supply rule, they
arenonetheless expansionary under an interest rate rule andhaveno effect
undera nominal GNP rule.It is impossible to examine fiscal policy in a
vacuum.
Section II of this paper demonstrates the theoretical importance of the
money demand specification for the sign of the tax multiplier. Section III—3—
examinesthe evidence, both econometric and non—econometric, on the scale
variable in the money demand function. Section IV discusses the historical
experience with two tax cuts: the l961taxcut and the 1981 tax cut.
Section V concludes with a discussion of implications for policy and direc-
tions for future research.
II. Theory-
Here we work with a slight extension of the textbook Keynesian IS—LM
model. We examine the effects of fiscal policy only on the aggregate demand
schedule. We do not address the issue of the appropriate aggregate supply
function. Our model is fully consistent with a variety of theories of
aggregate supply. In particular, to examine the impact of fiscal policy on
the level of output, our model could be coupled with a traditional Phillips
curve, a Lucas 11973] supply function, a model of nominal wage contracts
(Fischer [1977], Taylor [1980]), or a model of price stickiness (Okun
[19821, Rotemberg [1983], Manklv [1983]). The aggregate demand schedule is
the locus of price levels P and output levels Y that satisfy the IS and LM
curves. Without loss of generality, we can hold the price level P fixed;
changes in output Y thus represent shifts in the aggregate demand schedule.
A.A Simple Model
Webegin with a very simple model to illustrate the importance of the
money demand specification. Inparticular, we postulate that
(1) Y C(Y—T,r)+I(Y,r)+G_14_
(2) MI?= L(C,I,G,r)
where the notation is standard. We difytheliquidity preference function
(2) by allowing the demand for real balances to depend separately on C, I
and G rather than simply on their sum.2
The standard comparative statics exercise performed on this idel







is unambiguously positive under the standard assumptions that ly )0,
Cy > 'r0, Cr (0,L. (0,andCy+ly<1.
Equations (3) and (4)demonstratethat the effects of both tax and
spending changes are indeterminate without anyfurtherrestrictions.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the standard results to obtain are:
() dY> < IrLI+CrLC+ Lr
dG Ir4Cr
(6) dY< 0iffLC <+ Lr/Ir
dT
2We assume that all componants generate non—negative tney demand; that
is, L >0,L1 )0,and Lr )'0.
3Wefocus onthese twoin.iltipliers becausetheney ltipier has the
samesign as in the standard textbook analysis.—5—
Expression(5)impliesthat the spending niltiplier is positive as long as
government spending generates less money demand than a weighted average of
consumption andinvestment.As we discuss below, this condition seems
likely to be satisfied in practice. Expression (6)statesthe necessary
condition for expansionary- tax cuts. It is less clear whether this con
dition is satisfied. If consumer expenditure generates more money demar:
than investment andifmoneydemandis sufficiently interest inelastic re...a—
tive to investment, then tax cuts reduce aggregate demand.
To illustrate the ichanism driving the results graphically, consider
the special case of the model in which money demand depends onlyupon con-
sumer expenditure. Equation (2) becomes
(2') M/? =L(C(Y—T,r),r).
As in the standard analysis, a reduction in taxes causes an expansionary
shift in the IS curve. As shown in Figure 1, at any interest rate, the tax
cut raises consumption and thereby- increases the equilibrium level of out-
put. Contrary to the standard analysis, a tax cut also shifts the LM curve
in a contractionai-y direction. At any given level of income and interest
rate, consumption and thus money demand is greater. The net effect of the
tax cut on the level of output is ambiguous, as the IS and LM curves shift
in opposite directions.
Equation (2') suggests another model in which tax cuts are potentially
contractionary. If money demand depends on disposable income, then a tax
cut also shifts the LM curve in a contractionary direction. We concentrate
on themodel in iich consumption is the relevant scale variable ontheFigure 1








basisofourempiricalresults.From the standpoint of the simple IS—LM
modeldiscussed in this section, the model based on disposable incomeis
equivalent to the model based on consumption) If money demand depends on
after—taxincome or upon some variablethat is functionally related to
after—taxincome, such as consumption, then tax cuts may be contractionary.
B. A Preliminary Calculation
Before proceeding any further, we consider whether the condition fora
contractionary tax cut is possibly satisfied. Suppose that consumerexpen-
diture is the correct scale variable, as in equation (2'). Are theparame-
ters of the IS andLMcurves in the range necessaryto yield a perverse tax
multiplier?
If only C generates money demand, then expression (6) implies thata
tax cut is contractionary if and only if
(6') cC) CXCr
where Cc= thequantity elasticity of money demand,
Cr =theinterest semi—elasticity of money demand, and
=theinterest semi—elasticity of investment.
To ge.uge the sign of the tax multiplier, we must obtain estimates of these
economic paramenters.
It seems reasonable to posit that the quantity elasiticity ofmoney
demand is somewhat less than unity over a period of a fewquarters. This
more complete consumption function than that in our simple model
would highlight the difference between consumer expenditure and disposable
income as the scale variable in themoney demand function. For example,
consumerexpenditure also depends on expected future income. An anticipated
taxcut would shift the LM curie if C is the stale variable bt ntif—7—
conclusionis broadly consistent with the estimatesofFriedman 11978], Hall
[19T71,Goldfeld[19T3,19T6]andothers. We therefore use CC =0.8.
More difficult to obtain is consensus on the parameter Li..Theresults
of Friedman, Hall,andGoldfeld vary considerably but center aroundan
interest elasticity of about one—tenth. At an interest rate of eight per-
cent, this estimate implies a semi—elasticity of about 1.25.
The most difficult parameter estimate to obtain in the literatureis
theinterest semi—elasticity of investment. Friedman estimates that the
interest elasticity of real spending is 0.17 over a period of several qiar—
ters. Attributing two thirds of this sensitivity to investment and eva-
luating at I/Y =0.15andr =0.08,we obtain a value of r of about 9.
Hall uses a Cobb—Douglas production function and argues that the capital
stock adjusts about one fourthtothe long—run value in the first year. His
figuresimpl7 r is about 11. Based on thesetwo estimates, we use r =10
forourpreliminary calculation.
Tojudge the reasonableness of these parameter estimates, it is useful
to calculate the fiscal poiicy m.iltipliers in the standard IS—LM model.
With these estimates and the further asuxxrptions that Cy =0.7and
ly =Cr=0,the tax miltiplier in the standard model is —0.6,whilethe
spending miltiplier is +0.8. Thesemiltipliersare in line with those
impliedby large macro—econometric models. Eckstein [1983, p. 371reports
similations of the DRI model under alternative assu.mptionsregarding mone-
tarypolicy. If the level of non—borrowed reserves or the interest rate is
current Y—T is the scale variable.-8-
held constant, the spending multiplier reaches a peak of 1.6 or 2.1,respec-
tively, after six quarters.5 In contrast, if the Fed holds the ney supply
constant (the experiment we consider), the spending multiplier begins at 0.7
and declines steadily to zero after three or four years. Thus, ourpara-
meter estimates appear a reasonable stylized approximation to this larger
and ire complete del.
Using these estimates and noting that C/I is about four, we can now
check whether (6') is satisfied. We find:
0.8 )14 x1.25/10
0.8)0.5
Thus,although the uncertainty is necessarily large, expression (6')does
appear satisfied. If consumer expenditure is the correct quantity variable
inthe xney demand function, then tax cuts are probably contractionary.
Using our estimates and again assuming that Cy =0.7and ly =Cr=0,
we cancomputethe multipliers for ouralternativeIS—LM formulation using
equations (3)and (14). We find that the tax multiplier is +0.3, while the
spendingmultiplier is+0.7. Thus,althoughthe spending multiplier is not
greatly affected by the change in ney demand specification, the tax
multiplierchanges from —0.6to+0.3.
C. Implications of the Model
The de1 outlined above has importantimplicationsbeyond the sign and
size of the fiscal policy- multipliers. Iftaxcutsareindeed contrac—
SStandard estimates of the fiscal policy multipliers, suchas those in
the CBO Multipliers Projects 11977], assume the Fed holds the level of non—
borrowed reserves constant.—9—
tionary,then much standard Keynesian doctrine requires amendment. In this
section, we brieflynotesome of the model's implications.
First,if consumption is the scale variable in the money demandfunc-
tion, as in equation (2'), then the balanced budget multiplier is unity.
This value is, of course, larger than in the standard IS—LMmodel,in which
crowding out of investment implies a balanced budget multiplier less than
one. In our alternative model, there is no crowding out after a balanced
budget fiscal stimulus, since the increase in taxes reduces the demand for
money. This result also indicates that the full—employment deficit is an
inadequate measure of fiscal stimulus.
Second, whiletransfer payments are often called a form of government
spending,they should be regarded as negative taxes for the purposes of the
issues at hand. Transfers, like tax cuts,stimulateconsumer spending. In
theabove model, they may alsoshift the LM curve in a contractionary direc—
tion.
Third, our results suggest that policies to stimulate saving may
increase aggregate demand. Analytically, shocks to the consumption func-
tion, whether exogenous or induced by policy, have the same effects as per-
sonal tax cuts. Likewise, these results suggest that, in a world where the
money stock is held fixed, the paradox of thrift may not be a paradox at
all.
Fourth,these results imply that tax cuts aimed at stimulating business
investment have very different effects on aggregate demand than tax cuts
aimed at stimulating consumer spending. Even if personal tax cuts are
contractionary, business tax cuts may nonetheless be expansionary, since—10—
investment may generate less money demand thanconsumption.
Fifth, this analysis calls into question the efficacy of the tax
system as a stabilizer against shocks to aggregate demand. If,following a
positive shock to investment, automatic increases in tax collectionfurther
stimulate aggregate demand, then the tax system exacerbatescyclical fluc-
tuations. More generally, whether the taxsystem acts as an automatic sta-
bilizer or an automatic destabilizermay depend upon whether the monetary
authority is targeting interest rates or themoney supply.
D. Extensions of the Model
The textbook IS—LM model that we consider aboveis designed only to
focus on the short—run impacts of alternativemacro—economic policies.
Complicating the model along a variety of dimensions, however,would leave
the fundamental result unchanged. Ifmoney demand depends on consumer
spending more than other components of GNP, then a tax thatstimulates con-
sumer spending shifts the LM curvein a contractionary direction.
One possiblemodification of the model would be the inclusion wealth
effects and the government budget constraint,along the lines discussed by
Blinderand Solow [19731andChrist [1969]. Taking account of wealth
effects does not alter the impact effect offiscalpolicies. Rather, wealth
effectsbecome importantintheintermediate run as asset stocks change.
Becauseincreases in wealth affectconsumption directly, but notother corn-.
ponents of demand,using consumption as the scale variable in themoney
demandfunction would reduce the intermediate—run taxmultiplier in these
models 6
6Weare inclined to discount the relevance of thesee'ects, because we—11—
Another possible extension of the model would involve allowingfor
expectational effectsof policies on asset prices andconsumptiondecisions,
asin Blanchard's [19811developmentof a rational expectations version of
theIS—LMmodel.A permanent tax cutwouldshift the LM curveinwardas
consumers spent outof both the current andexpected future proceeds from
thetax cut. Moreover, long term interest rates would risein the shortrun
in anticipation of future tax cuts. Simulations by Fair 119T91 indicate
that taking account of expectational effects reduces estimated fiscal policy
multipliers. This finding suggests that an explicit treatment of expec—
tatiorial effects would only strengthen our conclusions.
So far we have assumed that consumers treat government bonds as net
wealth so that tax cuts increase consumer expenditure. The qualitative
character of our results would be identical if the private sector treats
only a fraction of bonds as net wealth. If government bonds are not net
wealth at all, as Barro [l9T1 suggests, then tax cuts do not stimulate con-
sumption and therefore shift neither the IS nor the LM curve. We believe,
however,that there is amplereason to doubt Barro's conclusion. The
existence of liquidity constraints, alternative models of the bequest motive
(Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers 1198111), and the non—lump—sum nature of
taxation(Barsky, Mankiw and Zeldes 1198111)make itis reasonable to posit
that tax cuts do stimulate consumer spending. The point of this paperis
thata stimulative effect on consumer spending is not sufficient to generate
astimulative effect on aggregate demand.
believethat the "long run" in which asset stock changes are important is
longer than the "long run" in which price flexibility restores full
employment.—12—
III. The Scale Variable in the Money Demand Function
The above discussion demonstrates the possibility that tax cuts are
contractionary. We nov address the empirical question of whether the
necessary condition for contractionary tax cuts is in fact satisfied.
Outside the stylized fantasylands of our models, there is no unambiguous a
priorianswer. The answer in large partdepends upon the parameters of the
moneydemand function which, as Cooley and LeRoy [19811 point out, are at
best difficult to estimate convincingly. We therefore draw upon a variety
of evidence, both econometric andnon—econometric,to determine whether con-
sumer expenditure is likely to generate more moneydemandthan other com-
ponents of GNP.
A. Existing Studies
Despite the theoretical importance of the scale variable in the money
demand function, relatively little is known about It. A consideration of
existing theoretical and empirical work, however, does point toward a
consumption—based view of moneydemand.In reviewing previous work, we
distinguish between studies thattake atransactions view of money demand
and those that take a portfolio view.
Much work assumes that money is held primarily for transactions pur-
poses. Although no one hasyetprovided a fully satisfactory micro—
foundation for the theory of money, most work on this topic employs
forüations in which money holding is closely linked to aggregate consump-
tion. Consider, for example, models emphasizing a "Clover cash—in—advance—13—
constraint," such asthoseofGrossmanandWeiss[1983] and Rotemberg
[198141.Similarly,dels placing money in theutility function, such as
that of Sidrauski [19671, implyafirst order condition linking consumption
to money holding. Indeed, thesemodels treat moneyholding exactly as
another consumption good.7
Existing empirical evidence comeslargely fromstudies comparing the
explanatorypower of alternative variables. Incontrast to our procedure
below, these studies do not typically nest the alternative hypotheses in a
singleequation. Both Goldfeld [19761 and Enzler, Johnson and Paulus [19761
try using a "weighted" GNP variable on the grounds that different categories
of expenditure are unlikely to generate the same quantity of transactions.
Rather than estimating the weights simultaneously with the parameters of the
moneydemand function,they impose them a priori. AlthoughGoldfeld finds
onlya slight improvement with this variable over standard GNP, Enzler,
Johnson and Paulus [p. 2781concludethat "the result is a slight improve-
ment in sample—period fit and a substantial reduction of post—sample error.
It appears that this line of inquiry should bepursued further."
One approach to moneydemand is to disaggregate either by type of asset
orby sector. Goldfeld [19731reports that his evidence "provides some
independentsupport formodel builders whochoose to use separatecurrency
anddemand deposit equations and who includeconsumption inthe currency
equation." Goldfeld [19761 also experiments with estimating money demand
TPoterba andRotemberg[1983] empirically implement such a formulation
of moneydemandwith some success.functions for householdmoney holding, which accounts for about two—thirds
of the total. He concludes [p. 7151 that "of the three transactions
variables, in the pre—197l period, GNP is clearly the worst, while consump-
tionandpersonalincomeare equally good." Both of these results from
disaggregate data suggest that tax cuts shift the 114 curve in a contrac—
tionary direction. If some part of money demand is a functionof consumer
expenditure, while the remainder is a function of total expenditure, then a
dollar of consumer expenditure generates more money demand than a dollar of
investment.
A second tradition views money demand as emerging outofa portfolio
allocation decision.The essence of the portfolio view is that money demand
should depend on the level of wealth or permanent income. Friedman and
Schwartz [1982, p. 38]suggestin their chapter on monetary theory that
Income as measured by- statisticians may be a defective
index of wealth because it is subject to erratic
year—to-year fluctuations, and a longer—term concept,
like the concept of permanent income developed in
connection with the theory of consumption, may be
more useful.
The correct measure of total wealth is permanent after—tax income. In this
portfolio view, a tax cut reduces perceived wealth for any given level of
before—taxincome and thus shifts the LM curveina contractionary direc-
tion.
Laidler [1977], in his comprehensive review of the moneydemandlitera-
ture, concludes [pp. 139_1t81 that the evidence favors permanent income over
current income or non—hun wealth as the scale variable. Judd and—15—
Scadding, in their recent survey paper [1982, p. 10081, writethat"one of
the conclusions reached about the demand for money in the pre—1973 period
(mostly based on annual evidence) is that permanent income or wealthoutper-
formed rrasured income in producing a stable money demand function."They
point out that subsequent work has shed only little new light on the rele-
vant scale variable.
After reviewing monetary trends in the United States over the past
hundred years, Friedman and Schwartz [1982] also conclude that permanent
incomebest explains the demand for money. If permanent income or total
wealth is the appropriate scale variable in the money demand function, then
economictheory suggests consumption as anideal proxy for these unobser-
vablevariables. Indeed, it has often been noted that the procyclical beha-
vior of the velocity of money is evidence for a permanent income view of
money demand, since the ratio of GNP to consumption is also strongly pro—
cyclical.
In summary,neitherthe transactions nor the portfolio view of money
demand points toward the use of current income as the scale variable. Both
theoretical and empirical considerations suggest the use of consumption in
the money demand function.
B. The Distribution of Money Holdings
Since the critical issue is the marginal propensity to hold money out
of different components of GNP, it is natural to inquire about the distribu-
tion of money holding.8 Table la presents some data on the ownership of the
8This distribution provides direct evidence on theaverage propensities
to hold money rather than on the marginal propensities. The average propen—








Households $268 6% $11473 90%
Non—financial Business 90 21 90 6
Financial Business 31 7 35 2
State and Local 8 2 11 1.
Government
Foreign Accounts 214 6 214 1
Total $1421 100 $1633 100
Source: Flow of Funds 1.ta, Year End Outstanding, 1980.
Note: Measured ?Eflisa daily average of numbers while the flow of funds
data is asured at a point in time. For December 1980, unad-
justed Ml was $1425 billion, while M2 as $1635 billion.—i6—
financialassets contained in Mland M2 as they arecurrently defined. For
both definitions of money, a very- large fraction is held by households.
This result is not entirely surprising. For at least two reasons, busi-
nesses are likely to be able to better economize on cash balances than
households. First, businesses are typically more sophisticated at financial
management than households. Second, economies of scale allow larger enti-
ties to hold less money relative to their size than small entities. Indeed,
theories of the transactions demand for money, such as Baumol 11952], Tobin
[1956]andMiller and Orr [1966], implyamuch less than unitelasticity
with respect to quantity. The empirical distribution in Table la is thus
broadly consistent with economic theory.
Table lb presents a rough attempt to allocate the holdings of Ml and M2
to different categories of expenditure. We allocate household holdings to
consumerexpenditure and government holdings to government expenditure. The
remainder, which is mostlyholdingsby-business, seems most related to total
production.Thus, weallocateittoeach component in proportion to that
component's share in G1qP. While these allocationsare crude, they are
nonethelesssuggestive of the effect of output composition on money demand.
The allocations inTablelb suggest that consumer expenditure generates
much greater money demand than investment. While consumer expenditure is
only614 percentof GNP,86 percent ofMl holding is allocated to this
component——a ratioof1.314. Investment, on the other hand,is15 percent of
GNP,but only 5 percentof Ml holding is allocated to this component——a
ratio of 0.33. These allocations indicate that a dollar ofconsumerexpen-
diture generates four times as much Ml demand as a dollar of investment.Table lb
Allocationof Money to GNP Components
Component C I
Component as Percent 64% 15% 20%
ofGNP (1980)
Ml
Percentof Money 86% 5% 9%
RatioofPercent of Money 1.34 0.33 0.45
to Percent of GNP
M2
Percent of Money 96% 1% 3%
Ratio of Percent of Money 1.50 0.07 0.15
to Percent of GNP
Note: Household holding allocated to C; state and local government
holding allocated to G; all other holding allocated in proportion to
component 'asharein GNP.—17—
The results using information on M2 are even more striking. Only 1
percent of holdings is allocated to investment, while 96 percent is allo-
cated to consumer expenditure. Following the same calculation as above, we
find that the propensity to hold moneyout ofconsumer expenditure is twenty
times the propensity to hold money out of investment.
Our theoretical discussion in Section II shows that the spending
multiplier may have a negative sign if government spending generates more
money demand than a weighted average of consumption and investment. Table
lb suggests that this result is unlikely, as relatively little money holding
is allocated to government spending. Moreover, all the money holding that
is allocated to G is by state and local governments; holdings by the federal
government are not included in the aggregates as currently defined.9 We
therefore confine our investigation to expression (6) and the effect of tax
cuts.Our examination of thedistribution of money holding suggests that
thecondition necessary for tax cuts to have a perverse effect may in fact
be satisfied.
C.The Stability of Velocity
The conclusion that "money matters" for the determination of aggregate
demandis now widely accepted among macro—economists. Its acceptance is to
a large extent attributable to the empirical work of Friedman andSchwartz
[1963,19821 and others showing the close empirical connection between mone-.
taryfluctuations andthebusiness cycle. Thesestudies emphasize that over
9These aggregates are the relevant concept of moneyif theyarethe
aggregates targeted by the Federal Reserve. Ifthe Fed were targeting an
aggregate that included Federal holdings of some financial assets, then a
perversespending iltiplier would be more plausible. This observation
highlightsthe irToortance of the monetarypolicyrule for the fiscal policy—18—
longperiods of history andundera variety of institutional arrangements,
nominal GNP moves in tandem withthemoney supply. Equivalently, velocity
appears relatively stable.
Even if velocity measured with respect to nominalGNPis stable,
however, this fact does not imply that GNP is the correct quantity variable
in the quantity equation. Gross national product is only a proxy for total
transactions, andanothervariable may be a better proxy. Empirically,
velocity measured with respect to another variable may be even more stable
than velocity traditionally defined. In this section, we therefore compare
alternative velocity measures. In particular, we compare velocity measured
withrespectto gross national product (Y/M) to velocity measured with
respectto nominal consumer expenditure (c/M). Our goal is to find the
nominal aggregate that yields the most stable measure of velocity.10
Wealso examine velocity calculated using other plausible aggregates.
One possible scale variable for the quantity equation is personal disposable
income (Y—T). Equation (2') above suggests this formulation. For the
questionofwhether tax cuts are expansionary, disposable income is func-
tionally the same as consumption. For both formulations of money demand,
tax cuts shift the 124 curve in a contractionary direction. Another can-
didate variable isprivatespending (c+i). As expression (6)demonstrates,
the relevant parametersfor the determining for effect of a tax cut arethe
marginal propensity to hold money out ofconsumption(L0) and the marginal
multipliers.
10We recognize that comparisons of the stability of velocity are just
comparisons of the goodness of fit of crude money demand equations. Below
we examine more standard money demand equations. We have two reasons for
examining velocity. First, itisan atheoretic approach which does not
require us to take astand ofthe exogeneity of income or interest rates.—19—
propensity to hold money out of investxnent (L1). We therefore directly com-
parethe use of C to the use of C+Iasthe scale variable. The last aggre-
gate we examine is final sales, which is gross national product less
inventory investment. As Blinder [19811 documents, inventory fluctuations
are very large over the business cycle. One might thus suspect that a jor
difference between fluctuations in C and Y is attributable to inventory-
behavior. Moreover, since ny theories of money holding are based on the
transactions motive, final sales appears a more reasonable variable to
includein the money dend function than total production. We therefore
considerthe use of final sales as thequantity variable.11
Thereis no unambiguous way to measure the standard deviation of velo-
city. We therefore compute this standard deviation under a variety of
alternative assumptions. Velocity has historically trended upward, which
suggestseither detrending or first—differencirig the data. We compute the
standarddeviation both ways. Wedetrend by regressing the log of velocity
ontime and the square of time. For longer time periods, we also try
including the cube of time. The residuals from this regression are always
highly correlated, suggesting that the detrended series is possibly not sta-
tionary. As Plosser and Schwert [19781 suggest, examining the data after
first—differencing iy be preferred in this situation. Paralleling the
above equation, we regress the change in the log of velocity on time. The
Second, in examining velocity, it is more natural to allow the the influence
of lagged money on output, which similar lags are less natural in money
dend functions.
11Another plausible variable to examine in this context is domestic
absorbtion, defined as GNPlessnet exports. We do not examine it here
because it varies so little relative to GNP in U.S. historical data. We
return to the question of international effects in the concluding section.—20—
timetrend is typically not significant in this regression and the residuals
are not highly correlated, indicating that velocity is well described as a
random walk.
It is widely believed that the money supply affects nominal GNP with a
lag. The relative success of the alternative nominal aggregates y be sen-
sitive to this timingissue.We therefore also examine, for the more recent
data, velocity defined as the nominal aggregate divided by the money supply
lagged six months.
Table 2a presents the standard deviation of Ml velocity for the
period between 1961 and 1982 using annual data. These figures do not
at allsupportthe traditional formulation usingnominalGNP. First,
velocitymeasured using consumer expenditure (c/M) is unambiguously
more stable than velocity measured using total production (Y/M).
Second, among the five hypotheses, consumer expenditure yields the most
stable measure of velocity in three out of four specifications. In the
fourth specification,disposable income produces the most stable velo-
city. Bothofthese scale variables implythat tax cuts shift the LM
curve ina contractionary direction.
An examination of M2 velocity, also presented in Table 2a, suggests a
similarconclusion for this broader monetary aggregate. For three of the
four specifications, consumer expenditure yields the most stable measure of
velocity.For recent data, consumer expenditure appears the most
appropriate variable in the quantity equation.
Table 2b presents the standard deviation ofvelocityfor the period
from1930 to1979. The monetary aggregate, which isfromFriedmn andTable 2a
The Standard Deviation of Velocity: 1961—1982
Level or First Difference L L F FD
Six Month Lag No Yes No Yes
Ml
Quantity Variable
Y (GNP) 1.91 2.00 1.68 1.56
C 1.142 1.148 1.13 1.00
Y—T 1.143 1.36 1.50 1.31
C+I 2.143 2.59 2.314 2.28
Final Sales 1.63 1.71 1.30 1.20
M2
Quantity Variable
'i () 2.18 1.73 2.35 1.93
C 2.05 1.82 2.10 1.83
Y—T 2.148 2.22 2.66 2.141
C+I 2.15 1.71 2.59 2.07
Final Sales 2.30 1.93 2.29 1.97
Note: Level is detrended by regressing the log of velocity on time and
the square of time. Similarly, the first difference is detrended by
regressing the change in the log of velocity on time. All entries are
standard errors of the regression, miltiplied by 100, and can thus be
interpreted as percentages. The data are annual.Table 2b
The Standard Deviation of Velocity: 1930—1979
Level or First Difference L L FD FD
Trend Variables t,t2 t,t2,t3 t t,t2
Quantity Variable
Y (P) 8.03 7.65 5.78 5.T6
C 9.2 7.76 14.114 14.11
Y—T 7.66 6.90 5.014 5.02
C+I 11.27 9.98 6.67 6.6i
FinalSales 8.00 7.147 5.59 5.58
Note:The log of velocity, oritsfirst difference, is regressed on the
trendvariables and a constant •Allentries are the standard errors of
the regression, .ilitplied by 100, and can thus be interpreted asper-
centages. The d.ta are annual; the money series is from Friedn.n and
Schvartz [19821.—21—
Schwartz 11982], is M2 undertheold Federal Reserve definitions.It is
more inclusive than the current Ml and less inclusive than the current l2
As the period weexamine in Table aisvery long, we tryincluding the cube
of time to see whether this more general detrending affects the results. We
find that its inclusion alters no result. Since this longer period includes
both the Great Depression and World War II, it is not surprising that velo-
city is much more volatile than during the shorter post—war period.
The figures in Table 2b again do not confirm the traditional use of GNP
in the quantity equation. When we examine the standard deviation of velo-
city around its trend, we find that disposable income produces the most
stable velocity. When we examine the first difference of velocity, consumer
expenditure yields the most stable velocity.
In sum, our examinationofthe stability of velocity provides no sup-
port for using GNP in the quantity equation. Consumer expenditure (c)is
themost successful scale variable of the five we consider. Disposable
income (Y—T) appears in second place. Both of these two formulations of the
quantity equation imply that tax cuts are contractionary.
D. Money Demand Estimates
One can view the quantity equation as an extremely simple money demand
function in which the quantity elasticity is unity and the interest elasti-
city is zero. Under these restrictive assumptions, consumer expenditure
appears the best scale variable in the money demand function. It is natural
12Ag discussed in more detail below, there is more variation in the con—
sumptionshare of GNPin the period between 1930 and 1955 than in the period
since1955. Examining the entire period necessitatesusing old M2, as it is
theonlyaggregatefor whichcomparabledataare readily available.—22—
toaskwhetherthis conclusion would hold after relaxing these restrictions.
Wetherefore turn to the direct estimation of ney demand functions.
In particular, wecomparethe standard formulation, inwhichreal GNPisthe
scalevariable and the GNP deflator is the price level, to the alternative
formulation, in whichrealconsumer spending is the scale variable and the
consumer expenditure deflator is the price level. We also compare the
consumption—basedndel to the other alternative hypotheses discussed above.
We estimate this equation:
(T) log(M)= + (1-A)log(Py) +Alog(P) +r
+U2 ((i—A)log(Y) +Alog(Cfl
whereM =theiney supply per capita,
Py =theGNP deflator,
=theconsumer expenditure deflator,
r =thenominal interest rate,
Y =realGNPpercapita,
C =realconsumer expenditure per capita.
The parameter A is the "consumption weight". If A =0,then the equation
reduces to the standard del is which GNPisthe scalevariable.IfA =1,
then we obtain the other polar case in which consumer spending is the scale
variable. For intermediate values of the consumption weight, all components
of GNPgenerate neydemand but consumer expenditure generates ire ney
demandthantheothercomponents. Thus,any positive valueofthe consump-
tion weight is sufficient to generate a contractionary shift in the LM curve—23—
after a tax cut.13
We estimate equation (7)usingnon—linear least squares. In all the
regressions, we also include a time trend, as is standard. To correct for
serial correlation, we quasi—difference (7) and estimate the autoregressive
parameter (rho) simultaneously with the coefficients.1 The interest rate we
use is the commercial paper rate, although the use of other interest rate
series has no important effect on the results. All the other right hand
side variables are annual National Income Accounts series.
Tables 3a and 3b present the estimates of (7)forthe recent sample
using and M2, as currently defined, as the monetary aggregate. The first
column in both tables contains estimates in which the conventional model
based on gross national product (Y) is compared to the consumption—based
model. The value of the consumption weight is 0.76forMl and 0.011for M2.
Thestandard errors of these numbers, however, are about 0.5. These figures
indicate that neither polar hypothesis can be rejected. That is, we cannot
reject the conventional specification (A =0).We also cannot reject the
other extreme that money demand depends only on consumer expenditure (A =1).
The reason for the recent data's inability to speak on this issue beco-
mes apparent in Figure 2, which displays the ratio of nominal consumer
13We useannual data and donot use lagged dependent variables in an
attemptto avoid someof the statistical problems that plauge earlier work
onmoney demand. While the use of lagged dependent variables is standard in
money demandstudies, we avoidthem because of the difficulty in identifying
distributedlags in this way in the presence of serial correlation.
Quarterly money demand functions withdistributedlags on the explanatory
variables are presented in the next section. For a discussion of this and
other problems, seeCooleyand LeRoy f 19811 and Gordon [198I].
ll4Estlmatjngthe equations in first—differenced formproduces results
almostidentical to those reported. This result is not surprising, as the
estimated value of theserial correlation correction is very high,indi-
cating that uasi—differericing is close to first—differencing.Table 3a
Ml Demand Estimates: 1960—1982
(1) (2) (3) (Ii)
Alternative Hypothesis Y Y—T C+IFinal Sales
Constant —0.144 —0.147 —0.35 —0.66
(0.21) (0.114) (0.19) (0.26)
Time Trend —0.029 —0.033 —0.032 —0.028
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
Interest Semi—elasticity —0.21 —0.23 —o.i6. —0.25
(0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Quantity Elasiticity 0.96 1.12 1.02 0.96
(0.23) (o.i6) (0.27) (0.19)
Consumption Weight 0.76 0.67 0.97 0.33
(0.145) (0.26) (0.27) (0.59)
Rho 0.86 0.81 0.87 0.83
(0.13)(0.15)(0.12) (0.114)
s.e.e. 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 3b
M2Demand Estimates: 1960—1982
(1) (2) (3) ()
AlternativeHypothesis Y Y—T C+IFinal Sales
Constant —0.57 —0.26 —0.07 _0.614
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.29)
Time Trend 0.0003—0.012 0.0003—0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Interest Semi—elasticity —1.07 —0.81 —0.96 —0.97
(0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22)
Quantity Elasticity 1.11 1.50 1.00 1.37
(0.26) (0.22) (0.33) (0.23)
Consumption Weight 0.014 0.87 0.38 0.32
(0.55) (0.25) (0.146)(0.53)
Rho 0.57 0.66 0.75 0.60
(0.20) (0.17) (0.114) (0.19)
s.e.e. 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.0114















































































































 expenditure to nominal GNP. During the past two decades, this ratio has
been verystable. The data cannot distinguish between the two hypotheses
because there has been little ixvement in the relevant independent variable.
During the 1930s, 192405, and early 1950s, however, there is substantial
movement intheconsumption share of GNP. This earlier period thus provides
a natural experiment that my allow us to distinguish between our two
hypotheses.
The first column in Table 24a compares the consumption—based model to
the GNP—based model forthe period between 1931and 1979. The monetary
aggregate is the old M2, which Friedman Schwartz use and is available only
through 1979. As expected, this larger sample period does provide more
Information. The estimated value of the consumption weight is 0.82 with a
standard error of 0.13. We can reject the conventional specification (A =
0)at the one percent level. We cannot reject the consumption—based alter-
native (A =1)at even the ten percent level. This regression provides
strong evidence that consumer expenditure generates more money demand than
other components of GNP.
Columns(2), (3) and(14) in Tables 3a, 3b, and 14a compare the
consumption—based model to the other hypotheses discussed above. The esti-
mates indicate the data are more consistent with the view that consumer
expenditure is the relevant scale variable in the money demand equation.
When we use the longer sample period in Table 4a, the consumption weight is
always closer to one than to zero.
The standard specification of money demand equations places the money
stockas the left hand side variable. Although in the previous three tablesTable 14a
Money Demand Estimates: 1931—1979
(1) (2) (3) (1k)
Alternative Hypothesis Y Y—T C+IFinal Sales
Constant —0.37 _0.214 0.51 —0.7
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16)
Time Trend —0.011 —0.009 —0.026 —0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Interest Semi—elasticity —0.58 —0.53 —0.28 —0.59
(0.53) (0.53) (o.5) (0.52)
Quantity Elasticity 1.13 1.05 1.81 1.22
(0.22)(0.21)(0.25)(0.21)
ConsumptionWeight 0.82 0.77 1.50 0.76
(0.13) (0.18) (0.08) (0.11)
Rho 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.814
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
s.e.c. 0.0140 0.0140 0.0314 0.039
Standard errors arein parentheses.—25—
wefollowthis convention, itisalso possible to write equation CT) with
the interest rate as the left band side variable. The inverted money demand
function is:
(8)r =+ 8iElog(M) —(i—A)log(Py) —Alog(P)1
+2[(i—A) log(Y) +Alog(C)1
The two specifications,(7)and(8), represent the samestructural model.
Their estimation, however, need not lead to the same result. Least squares
estimationof (7) assumes thatthe residual is orthogonal to the interest
rate, while estimation of (8)assumes that the residual is orthogonal to the
moneystock. It seems reasonable to examine the robustness of our conclu-
sion regarding the consumption weight to this alternative identification
assumption.
Table 14b presents the results of estimating (8) for the longer sample
period, 1931—1979, during which there is variation in the consumption share
of GNP.15 The results are similar to those we obtain when we estimate
equation (7). The point estimate for theconsumption weight when the
consumption—based model iscompared to theconventional specification using
GNPis 0.96.We can reject the hypothesis that the consumption weight is
zero, while we cannot reject the hypothesis that the consumption weight is
one •16
1SEstimating(8)with only recent dataproducesestimates of A with
standard errors so large that rioinferencescan be drawn.
l6in some ways, the results in Table Ibareunsatisfactory. For example,
thefirst column implies anincome elasticity of 1.6 and aninterest semi—
elasticity of 11.5, both of which are taich higher than the range of
generally accepted values.Table b
Inverted Money DemandEstimates: 1931—79
DependentVariable: rt
Ci) (2) (3) (1k)
Alternative1ypothesis Y Y—T C+IFinalSales
Constant —2.17 —2.18 —9.08 —2.80 (5.o) (.71)(ii.i1)(5.80)
TimeTrend 0.08 0.08 —0.18 0.07
(0.15) (0.15) (o.i1.) (o.i6)
Real Balances —5.35 -5.55 -8.80 -5.77 (3.rs)(3.50) (2.50) (3.92)
Quantity Variable 8.73 8.93 21.13 9.50
(8.56)(8.17)(8.06)(9.10)
Consumption Weight 0.96 0.87 1.51 0.89
(0.141)(0.50) (0.20) (0.35)
Rho 0.58 0.57 0.33 0.58
(0.15) (0.114) (0.16) (0.15)
s.e.c. 1.07 1.07 1.03 1.07
Standard errors are in parentheses.—26—
E.Implications of the Estimates
Ourestimatesof the moneydemandfunction allowusto make somecrude
inferencesaboutthe sign of the tax multiplier. Algebraic manipulation of





Cr=theinterest semi—elasticity of money demand,
=thequantity elasticity of money demand,
=theinterest semi—elasticity of investment.
Ifprivatespending (c+i) or final sales is substituted for GNP in equation
(T),theimplied condition (6") remains the same)7 If disposable income
(Y—T) isthealternative, however, then (6') above is the relevant condition
determining the sign of the tax multiplier.
We can now useourestimatesof the money demand functiontocheck
whether tax cuts are expansionary or contractionary. The only missing para-
meter is the interest semi—elasticity of investment. Table 5presentsthe
critical value of this parameter for each ofourmoney demand estimates. If
this semi—elasticity exceeds the critical value, thentax cuts are contrac—
tionary. As we discussed earlier, estimates of this semi—elasticity suggest
1TThe data are notpowerful enoughto allow separateestimationof the
propensity to hold money out of each component of GNP. The theoretical aria—
lysis in Section II indicates that the crucial propensities are LC and L1.
One can view our spec1fication as allowing estimation of these two propen-
sities while imposing alternative apriori constraints on the propensitiesTable 5
Implications of the Estimates:
The Critical Value of the Interest Semi—elasticity of Investment
Table
Alternative Hypothesis
Y Y—T C+I Final Sales
* Indicatesthat tax cuts are probably contractionary, since the criti-
cal value is less than 10.
Note: If the interest semi—elasticity of investment exceeds the criti—
cialvalue, then tax cuts arecontractionary. The critical value Is















Not surprisingly, the results from Tables 3a and3bdo not provide a
clear answer to the question of whether tax cuts are expansionary. The
estimates for the post—war period are imprecise and vary widely. For some
specifications, the critical value is far above the plausible range, while
for others, it is far below. Since the recent period provides little infor-
mationontherelevant scale 'ariable in the iney demand function, it sheds
littlelight on thesignofthe tax multiplier.
The results from Tables 1a, however, are unequivocal.As long as
theinterest elasticity of investment exceeds 21'2,theseestimates indicate
that tax cuts are contractionary. Alltheestimates usingthe entiresample
implythat the ratio of the quantity elasticity to the interest semi—
elasticity exceeds two. Moreover, the consumption weight is always close to
one. These two findings imply a critical value of about two or less. Thus,
ourestimates ofthe money demand function, together with anyplausible
estimate of the interest semi—elasticity of investment, imply that tax cuts
depressaggregate demand.18
IV. The Experience of Two Tax Cuts
The empirical work above indicates that the condition for tax cuts to
be contractionary is probably satisfied for the U.S. econonv. This result,
however, may at first appear incredible. Tax cuts are not an untried
tohold money outof other components.
18A5noted ina previous footnote,the parameter estimates implied bythe
results in Table 1bare outof line with the range of generally accepted
values. We therefore refrain from drawing anygeneralequilibrium inferen-
ces.—28..
experiment. Whydoesthe historicalexperiencenot directly refute our
seemingly bizarreconclusion?
In this section, we discuss twoofthe largest tax cuts in post—war
history. The first is the 1961e Kennedy—Johnson tax cut,whichappears to
have hadtheconventional stimulatory effect. The second is the recent
Reagan tax cut, which was followed by the deepest post—war recession.
A. The 19614 Tax Cut
The 19614 tax cut isoften viewedasthe prototy-pe of anexpansionary
tax cut. At the time, itwaswidely considered a successful experiment with
the use of fiscal policy for cro—economic stabilization. The results of
this experiment, however, do not contradict the ourconclusions.We examine
in this paper theeffect of a tax cut given a particular path ofthe uney
supply. In the afterth of the 19614 taxcut, theney supply wasnotin
fact held to a constant path.
in the hisclassicanalysis of the 19614 tax cut, Okun[19681writes:19
Byarr measure of interest rates or credit conditions I
know, there werenosignificant zxnetary changesthatwould
have either stiuiuj.ated or restrainedinvestment to a jor
degree. Obviously, the rising incomes and investment of this
period generated increased dends for financial assets and
for loans. In this environment, the .intainance ofstable
interest rates and stable credit conditions required action by
the nnetary authority to expand the reserve base re
rapidly so astoaccomodate expansion.
Okun suggests that the experiment tried in 19614 wastheeffect of a tax
cutgiven a particular pathof interest rates. The sign of thistax
19Ok'sanalysis of the 19614 tax cut providesthe basisfor the textbook
discussion in, for example, Dornbusch and Fischer [1981j.-29-
imiltiplier is negative, regardless of the scale variable in the money demand
function. In fact, the ex post real return on three month treasury bills
declined from 2.3 percent in 19614 to 2.1 percent in 1965 and to l. percent
in 1966. This fact indicates that monetary policy did even more than stabi-
lize real rates in the period following the 19614 tax cut.
Okun also writes:
Itis reasonable to ask how much slower the overall eco-
nomic advance might have been and how niich less expansionary
the tax cut would have been if monetary policy bad not been
accomodatirig. One could hypothesize an alternative monetary
policywhich held the growth of bank reserves or the money
supply (orother liquidity variables) to some stated degree.
And one could then try to assess what difference this tighter
monetary policy would have made in the pace oftheeconomic
advance. That would be an interesting statistical exercise.
It just does not happen to be the particular statistical
exercise which this paper attempts to perform.
Thus, the conventional conclusion that the 19614 tax cut bad a important
role in the subsequent expansion sheds no light on the question we address.
B. The Recent Episode
The tax cuts enacted in 1981 provide a better experiment to gauge the
signof the tax imiltiplier. The Federal Reserve was committedto a more
monetaristpolicy in the early 1980s than in the 1960g. Onits face, this
recentexperience is not supportive of the conventional Keynesian doctrine.
The increase in the unemployment rate from T.5percentinJanuary1981 to
10.8percentinDecember 1982 does not suggest a large stimulatory effect.2°
200nemight argue thatthe tax cuts took time to have an effect, espe-
cially since the bulkof themtook effect only in1982 and1983.Thewidely
accepted permanentincomehypothesis, however, implies thattheirstimula-
tive effect should occt,r assoonasthey are announced.Infact,the con—
sumptiori share ofGNP rached a thirty yearpeak in 1982.—30—
Thelarge increase in unemployment andlargefall in outputduring this
period was not independent of the monetary policypursued.Butnorcanthe
recession be fully explained by a deceleration of moneygrowth.The growth
in Ml, fourthquarterto fourthquarter,was7. percentin 1980,5.2per-
cent in 1981, and 8.T percent in 1982. The comparable figures for ! are
9.0 percent, 9.3 percent, and9.5percent. These monetary growth figures do
not in themselves suggest that monetary policy wasoverly contractionary.
Thebehavior of velocity during this period, however, was abnormal, and
this fact largely explains the collapse in aggregate demand. Velocity con-
ventionally defined (Y/Ml) fell by 5.7 percent between the fourth quarter of
1981 and the fourth quarter of 1982. The historical average of the change
in velocity between 1961 and 1981 is a increase of 3.2 percent with a stan-
dard deviation of 1.7 percent. Thus, this large fall was by recent histori-
cal standards a very unusual event. An examination of M2 tells a similar
story. The average change in M2 velocity between 1961 and 1981 is about 0.2
percent, with a standard deviation of 2.5 percent. In 1982, however, it
fell by 6. percent. Again, the tallinvelocity in 1982 was abnormal by
recent historical standards.
If we examine velocity defined using personal consumer expenditure, the
recession appears more normal. C/Ml fell from the fourth quarter of 1981 to
the fourth quarter of 1982 by only 1.1 percent, Although still large rela-
tive to the historical average increase of 3.0 percent, this drop is less
unusual than the 5.7 percent fall in Y/Ml. dM2 fell by 2.8 percent, which
is only slightly more than one standard deviation from the mean change of
zero and mich less that the 6.1 percent fall in Y/M2. With both monetary—31—
aggregates,the behavior of consumption velocity is more normal than the
behavior of velocity conventionally defined.
The samestory emergesfrom an examination of the forecasting perfor—
manceof conventional money demand equations. We estimate quarterlymoney
demandfunctions for the period 1961:1 to 198O:I.Theinterestrate and
quantityvariable enter the equation as a second order Almonlag over the
current andthreepast quarters. The residual is assumedtofollow a first—
order autoregressiveprocess. We estimate both the standard specification,
inwhich GNP is the scale variable, and the alternative specification, in
whichconsumer spending is the scale variable. The results from this esti-
mation are summarized in Table 6a.21
Using the two formulations, we forecast money holdings from 1981:]. to
198:1 using the observed path of interest rates, GP aridconsumerspending.
Theforecast errorsare presented, quarter by quarter, in Table 6b.
Althoughnot reported, we alsotriedbreaking the sampleat other points
besides 1981:1. The results were almost identical to those in Table 6b.
An examination of the forecast errors from the standard specification
demonstratesa large increase in moneyholdings starting toward theend of
1982. By the trough of the recession (l982:I), this specification underpre—
dictsmoney demand by4.l percent. The alternative specification underpre—
dictsby only1.6percent. Similarly, the conventional specification
underpredicts M2 holding by 2.T percent at the trough, while the alternative
specification actually overpredicts by 1.1 percent. The root mean squared
2-Using C as the scale variable tends to increase the quantity elasticity
and decrease (in absolute value) the interest semi—elasticity, making the LM
curve more vertical.Table 6a
Quarterly Money Demand Functions
(i) (2) (3) (14)
Money Aggregate Ml M2 M2
Scale Variable GNP C GNP C
Constant —0.66 —o.14r —o.14r —0.17
(0.114) (0.09) (o.i14) (o.io)
Time —0.006 —0.007 0.001 0.000
(o.ooi)(o.ooi) (0.001)(0.001)
Interest —0.65 —0.55 —1.88 —1.77
Semi—elasticity (0.22)(0.20)(0.22)(0.19)
Quantity 0.82 1.10 0.99 1.18
Elasticity (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15)
Rho 0.914 0.97 0.92 0.98
(0.014) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
S.e.c. 0.00630.0058 0.0061 0.0056
Note: This table presents the sum of the coefficient estimates. Both
the interest rate andthequantity variable enter as a second order
Almonlag onthe current andthreelaggedvalues.Table 6b
Percent Error of Forecast inning 1981:1
(1) (2) (3) (14)
Money Aggregate Ml Ml M2 M2
Scale Variable GNP C GNP C
1981: 1 0.2 0.14 —0.1 0.9
2 —2.1 —1.14 —3.5 —i.8
3 —0.1 0.2 —14.2 —3.0
14 0.6 0.5 —3.5 —2.9
1982: 1 —0.8 —0.3 —14.0 —2.6
2 —0.1 0.2 —3.3 —1.8
3 —2.1 —0.3 —3.2 —0.2
14 —14.1 —1.6 —2.7 1.1
1983: 1 —14.8 —3.0 —3.14 —0.1
2 —6.8 —14.14 —2.8 1.3
3 —8.1 —5.6 —2.3 1.8
14 -8.0 —5.7 —2.14 1.5
19814: 1 —8.0 —6.1 —1.6 1.8
Root Mean Squared Error 14.7 3.2 3.0 1.8—32—
error, which summarizes theforecastingperformance of the two equations,
indicates that the specification based on consumptionoutperforms the sped-
fication based on GNP by thirty or forty percent.
In suary-, the collapse in aggregate demandleading to the 1982
recession is largely attributable to the abnormal fall invelocity or,
equivalently, to the large increase in money demand. We canexplainat
leastpart of this change by the strength in consumer spending. Ifpolicy—
makers hadviewed moneydemand as determined by consumer spending, the
recentbehavior of money demand and the depth of the recession wouldhave
been less surprising.22
V. Conclusions
Our analysis calls into question the standard Keynesianconclusion that
personal tax cuts increase aggregate demand even without monetary acconioda—
tion.Both apriori considerations and historical experience suggest that
GNP isnot theappropriate scale variable in money demand functions.
ReplacingGNPwith consumerexpenditure or disposable income is sufficient
toalter dramatically the implications of standard Keynesian models. The
econonor'sexpansion following the 19614 taxcut iseasilyexplained by the
accomodative monetary policy. Moreover, our modification of the standard
money demand function canhelpexplain the anoinolous behavior of velocity
following the 1981 taxcut.
Itis important to recognize twolimitationsof ouranalysis.First,
22The rapid recovery of output in 1983 doesnot provide evidence of the
efficacyofthe taxcuts.Ml growth was10.1percent from the fourth
quarterof 1982 to the fourth quarter of 1983, compared with 8.7percentin
1982 and 5.2 percent in 1981. Three—month Treasury billyields declined by
14io basis points betveen July 1982 andJanuary 1983.There is everyreason—33—
we examine only the effects of tax cuts on aggregate demand. We do not
discuss their effects on supply decisions. Ourconclusions,therefore, do
not shed light on the appropriate level of taxation or public spending in
the long run. Second, our analysis considers the effect of tax cuts
assuming a constant path of some monetary aggregate. Depending on the Fed's
reaction function, a wide range of alternaite outcomes is possible. Our
assumptionthat the moneystockis held constant in the face of tax changes,
however,is a natural and conventional benchmark.
Our results have important implications for economic policy during a
periodof large budget deficits. They suggest that even large personal tax
increases or reductions in transfer payments need not reduce the level of
economic activity. Indeed, by reducing interest rates, they might even
speed the recovery. In contrast, sharpreductionsin government purchases
mightsignificantly reduce aggregate demand ifaconstantmonetary policy
werepursued.Asimilar conclusion applies to business tax increases.
Unlike personal tax increases, business taxes do not reduce the demand for
money; these taxes thus have the standard contractionary effect on aggregate
demand. In short, assessing the short—run impact of deficit—reducing
measures requires a careful examination of their implications for money
demand.
Ourresultsalso have important implications for monetary policy.
Governmentfiscal policy actions thatchangethe composition of GNP systema-
tically affect the velocity ofmoney.Tax increases, for example, which
to believe that monetaryand not fiscal policyisthecauseoftherécovery.reduce the share of consumption and d.isposable income in GNP, increase velo-
city. By suggesting yet another reason for expecting velocity to be
variable, our results further call into question the desirability of
targetting netary aggregates.
Our analysis considers the impact of fiscal policy changes in a closed
econor.It wouldbe easy toextend it by considering open econonj effects.
In an openeconoxxr,it would be natural to consider the possibility that
moneydemanddepends on absorbtion rather than GNP. Alongwiththe standard
Mundell—Fleming small country assumptions, this dification could imply a
negative miltiplier for both increases in government spending andcutsin
taxes •TheU.S •currentaccount hasnot varied enoughto makeiteasy to
identify separately the marginal propensities to hold cney outofGNPand
absorbtion. Such an examination, however, should be possible using data for
other countries. In addition, international data would be valuable in
shedding further light on whether consumption, GNP or some other component
ofdomestic income is the appropriate scale variable in theney demand
function.
Futureresearch could extend our empirical results in several other
directions. Cross—sectional data could be brought to bear on the question
of what scale variable is appropriate in the ney demand function. Our
empirical analysis couldbereplicated using alternative m,netary aggregates
and adding other variables to the ney demand function along the lines
discussedin Laidler[197T1andJudd and Scadding [1983).Inaddition,it
wouldbe valuable to embed a money demandfunctionwith consumption as a
scale variable in a large Keynesian macro—econometric de1 and then to exa——35—
mine its properties. This experiment would refinethehighlystylized
calculations presented here.—36—
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